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I. Introduction
2005 are clearly outdated given Asia's economic dynamism. In this context, the World Bank's partial update is insufficient. Because of the paucity of household survey data beyond 2008, 3 It is critical to note that poverty reduction across the region was uneven, with East Asiaparticularly the People's Republic of China-outperforming the rest in the region. For low income economies (e.g. ADF-Only economies), poverty reduction was far less impressive.
The following section outlines the three approaches used in calculating updates and projections-the choice of approach is dictated by the type of DMC data available. Section 3 discusses the poverty estimation results along with the 2009 and 2010 projections. Section 4 explores the reliability and sensitivity of the estimates. Section 5 briefly discusses the implications of the poverty updates. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
II. Methodological Issues
In estimating regional poverty, the first step is to set poverty lines that are comparable across economies. Thus, the common $1.25 and $2 per day poverty lines are used here and converted into local currency by using purchasing power parity rates (PPPs) available from PovcalNet. These are presumably based on the last ICP round. From these perspectives, the poverty updates here maintain consistency with World Bank estimates. 4 The national consumer price index (CPI) is used to inflate poverty lines or deflate consumption data to take into consideration price changes over time (CPI 2005 = 100) . As the poor are normally disproportionately affected by higher food and possibly fuel prices, adjustments are made to the national CPIs using information on household budget shares and the difference between food and nonfood inflation. For each economy, let CPI 1 denote the national CPI. Then the CPI for the poor, or CPI 1 p , can be derived as CPI 1 p = CPI 1 + B(F-M), where B represents the gap in the food budget share between the general consumer and the poor while F and M denote the food and nonfood CPIs for the general consumer (for details, see Section 4). Based on household survey data and official CPIs available to ADB, the average B in Asia is estimated to be 14%; with F-M estimated to be 14% as well. Thus, adjustments to national CPIs are typically under 2%, which is rather small.
To estimate poverty, one can simply count the number of poor below a specific poverty line where individual or household survey data are available. This approach is used to obtain poverty updates for Bhutan (2007) , 5 Indonesia (2008) , Pakistan (2008) , and the Philippines (2009). 6 Accuracy of estimation depends on how representative the survey data are, and that rests with data providers, generally the national statistics office.
When individual or household survey data are unavailable, it is still possible to estimate poverty using grouped observations such as quintile or decile consumption information. These observations represent points on the underlying Lorenz curve. Many studies exist on techniques for ungrouping the grouped data-enabling recovery or approximation of individual or household data from the grouped form. Ungrouping inevitably comes with approximation errors. For a recent application of this approach, see Chotikapanich, Rao, and Tang (2007) . Shorrocks and Wan (2009) improve the approximation accuracy. This ungrouping approach is used to obtain 2010 poverty estimates for India 7 and 2008, 2009, and 2010 estimates for the People's Republic of China (PRC). 8 When individual, household, or grouped data are unavailable, it is impossible to count the poor directly. For these countries, 2008 poverty updates 9 from the World Bank's PovcalNet are used if consistent with 2005 estimates. Otherwise, poverty elasticity of growth-the percent change in HCR for every percent change in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita-can be combined with year-on-year per capita GDP growth to calculate the yearly change in poverty. Using the latest reliable poverty estimate period as benchmark year, simply applying the yearly poverty changes to the benchmark estimate produces the update. This "elasticity approach" is used to update poverty in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The reliability of this approach depends on the quality of the estimated poverty elasticity of growth, which is discussed in Section 4.
For the elasticity approach, Asian Development Outlook 2011 provides real per capita GDP growth rates. For the poverty elasticity of growth, alternative estimates exist-5 The poverty elasticity approach (discussed later) is used to obtain 2008 estimates. 6 For the Philippines, 2009 estimates based on household survey data yield an HCR quite close to official government estimates when adjustments are made to the poverty line. These are used to derive 2008 estimates using the poverty elasticity approach. 7 India released its 2010 survey data on 27 July 2011. Based on this data, the Planning Commission reported an HCR of 32% using the national poverty line of $1.12 per day. This is consistent with our estimate of 33.29% using the $1.25 per day poverty line and the ungrouping method. Due to the urgent need for poverty updates, in this paper, 2010 grouped data are used as procuring and processing survey data take time. Furthermore, the ungrouping method used here is quite accurate. Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Turkmenistan in their study. For these countries, the elasticity is approximated using relevant subregional estimates of Hasan, Magsombol and Cain (2009) . 11 Poverty elasticity estimates used in this paper are listed in Table 1 . Estimates in absolute values are larger under the $1.25 per day poverty line than those under the $2 per day poverty line, which is consistent with the findings of Chen and Ravallion (2009) . A summary of the approaches used in this paper is shown in Table 2 . (Figure 1 ). Three countries saw more than 10 percentage points cut in their HCR. Significant reductions were also seen in Viet Nam (9 percentage points) and the PRC (7 percentage points). For Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Thailand, the reductions were less than 1 percentage point, as these countries had low HCRs to begin with. In terms of percentage changes in HCR, Malaysia tops the list, followed by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Figure 2 ). More than two-thirds of the DMCs had at least a 20% reduction in HCR. However, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste showed less than a 5% reduction. A significant number of DMCs-in particular low-income countries-saw an increase in the number of poor despite a reduction in HCR. This may be attributed to population growth outstripping poverty reduction due to sluggish gross domestic product (GDP) growth and/or worsening inequality. For example, in Nepal and Papua New Guinea, the poverty HCR declined by 2.7 and 1.0 percentage points, respectively, but the number of poor living below the $1.25 per day poverty line actually increased.
As expected, poverty reduction is uneven across countries and between subregions, with East Asia-particularly the PRC-outperforming the rest (Figure 3 ). Of the 150 million who exited extreme poverty during 2005-2008, the PRC accounted for roughly 85 million (or 57% of the region's total) and India, 29 million (20%). Viet Nam and Bangladesh also did well, bringing 7 million (5%) and 6 million (4%) people out of extreme poverty. In Pakistan, about 5 million people (3%) stepped out of extreme poverty during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . By subregion, while substantial poverty reduction occurred in East Asia, Central and West Asia, and Southeast Asia (Table 4) , the Pacific was less encouraging, partly due to rapid population expansion and the lack of robust economic growth. For the subregion as a whole, the number of poor actually increased from 2. 
B. Asia's Poverty in 2008 under the $2 Per Day Poverty Line
Using the $2 per day poverty line brings several interesting findings (Table 5) In terms of percentage changes in HCR, the picture is less impressive than under the $1.25 per day poverty line. Only 11 countries reduced their HCRs by 20% or more, while the HCRs in 9 countries fell less than 9% ( Figure 5 ). Kazakhstan tops the tally with an 85% decline, followed by Malaysia and Azerbaijan with 69% and 56% reductions, respectively. The PRC's performance was remarkable, with more than 137 million people moved above the $2 per day poverty line between 2005 and 2008. This accounts for 82% of the region's total reduction in the number of poor under the $2 per day poverty line (Figure 6 ). Indonesia also performed well, with a 16.7 million reduction or 10% of the total. These two countries, among the most populous in Asia, account for some 92% of those rising above the $2 per day poverty line. There is much heterogeneity subregionally under the $2 per day poverty line (Table 6 ).
In terms of HCR, East Asia performed better than the rest of the region, with a 30% reduction. Southeast Asia ranked second with a 16% reduction, followed by Central and West Asia with an 11% reduction. South Asia reduced its HCR by less than 4%. The Pacific saw its HCR reduced the least. In South Asia and the Pacific subregions, the number of poor under the $2 per day poverty line actually increased, as population growth outpaced the rate of poverty reduction. 
C. Poverty Projections for 2009 and 2010
Poverty is also estimated for 2009 and 2010 (see Tables 3 and 5 ). Most of them are projections using the elasticity approach. The results indicate that even during the global economic crisis, Asia managed to further reduce the number of poor. In 2009, the number of people below the $1.25 per day poverty line is projected to be 705 million-48.6 million less than the 2008 total. An additional 46.8 million people is estimated to have exited extreme poverty in 2010, bringing the total number of extreme poor in Asia to 658 million, or 18.7% of the total population.
The continued poverty reduction during the crisis and recovery periods can be attributed to robust economic growth in the region. From Table A1 in Appendix A, it is clear that with the exception of Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, the region's most populous countries continued to grow during the global economic crisis and in 2010, albeit at a more moderate pace.
IV. Reliability and Sensitivity Analyses
For several large countries in the region-Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippinesupdates are expected to be reliable as they are based on actual household data. But how reliable are poverty estimates based on the ungrouping and elasticity methods?
A.
Reliability of the Ungrouping Method
The ungrouping approach used for the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India 14 is fairly reliable. To demonstrate reliability, HCR estimates based on actual survey data can be compared with those based on grouped survey data. For Bhutan, the differences are found to be negligible-0.04 percentage point under the $1.25 per day poverty line and 0.22 percentage point under the $2 per day poverty line. Using the 2001-02 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey data, 100 samples with 1000 observations each were drawn randomly from a total of some 16,000 observations. Quintile shares were computed first, after which the ungrouping algorithm was applied. The HCRs were then computed and compared with the HCRs directly counted from the 1000 observations. The average absolute deviation was about 0.26 percentage point. The same experiment was repeated using the 2006 Philippine Family Income and Expenditure Survey. The average absolute deviation was around 0.5 percentage point. In both cases, there were instances where differences were nil.
B. Reliability of the Elasticity Method
What about the elasticity approach? First, this approach is not used for large, poor developing member countries (DMCs) with the exception of Bangladesh. Second, the validity of this approach can also be assessed. For countries with household survey data, one can compute the difference between the elasticity-based poverty estimates and those directly counted from survey data. In terms of HCR, the difference is found to be within 1.0 percentage point for Indonesia and Viet Nam. For the Philippines, the difference is below 0.43 percentage point. Finally, the sensitivity analysis below shows that altering elasticities by (+/-) 5-20% does not alter the regional picture much (Table 7) .
A rigorous sensitivity analysis of poverty elasticity can use information on confidence intervals of the elasticity estimator. This is quite complicated and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, sensitivity here is analyzed by altering elasticity estimates by 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, in both directions.
Overall, regional poverty is not very sensitive to changes in elasticity. 
C. Sensitivity to Purchasing Power Parity Rates
The purchasing power parity rates (PPPs) used in this paper are typically constructed for representative consumers in a country. Whether PPPs specially constructed for the poor are more appropriate is debatable. In a recent study, Deaton and Dupriez (2009) computed PPPs for the poor, weighting various prices by budget shares of the poor instead of representative consumers. These PPPs were then used to estimate global poverty. They concluded that the computational results remain almost identical irrespective of which PPPs were used. In light of this, poverty updates provided here are expected to be robust whether general PPPs or PPPs constructed for the poor were used.
Interestingly, ADB (2008) examined the sensitivity of poverty estimates to PPPs under a proposed $1.35 per day poverty line 15 and found that using PPPs specially constructed for the poor led to lower poverty incidence than using the normal consumption PPPs (Table 8 ). This is in line with observations that normally the poor spend rather carefully by shopping around-they can buy more than the rich with the same amount of expenditure. For example, the rich in the Philippines often go to supermarkets, while the poor go to the cheaper wet market for the same commodity. This does not contradict findings that food crises bring increased poverty because crises affect the poor's income and expenditure adversely. 
D. Sensitivity to Consumer Price Indexes
Given that PPPs and CPIs are constructed using similar methodologies and procedures, the conclusion of Deaton and Dupriez (2009) can be applied to CPIs as well. In other words, poverty estimates are unlikely to be sensitive to CPIs, whether using general CPIs or CPIs for the poor. However, food prices soared during the 2007/08 global food crisis, possibly affecting the poor more than others. Thus it may be useful to examine the sensitivity of the poverty updates to CPIs. Towards this end, CPIs for the poor will be derived.
Without loss of generality, suppose two groups of commodities are considered for estimating CPIs: a nonfood group with a price denoted by and a food group with a price . Let the superscripts 0 and 1 index the base and terminal periods, it is natural to set and so the base period , irrespective of whether the poor or general consumer budget shares are used as weights for aggregation. Now, for the terminal year, prices rose for both nonfood and food items. Assume the price of the nonfood group rose by M% and the food group by F%. Then we have
The difference between the usual CPI and CPI for the poor, denoted by , arises only because food items usually account for a larger portion of the poor's consumption expenditure, as dictated by Engel's law. When all food prices rise in the same proportion, no substitution is possible. In this case, if government does not intervene, the poor would be hit harder than the general consumer. Again, without loss of generality, assume the food budget share for the poor differs from that for the benchmark population by B (the nonfood budget share is and for the benchmark population and poor respectively). Thus Since is known, its difference with can be easily computed once the latter is obtained:
The difference between the CPI for the poor and the usual CPI thus depends on two factors: (i) the difference in the Engel coefficient or gap in food budget share, denoted by B, and (ii) the difference in the price increases for food and nonfood items from the base period to the terminal period, denoted by F-M.
Gaps in the food budget share between the poor and the general consumer can be calculated based on the various household data available (Table 9 , column 3). 16 While the gap is as large as 21% in Bhutan, it is about 14% for most countries. Regarding inflation, not many countries report separate food and non-food CPIs. By taking 2005 as the base year and 2008 the terminal year, the difference in food and nonfood CPIs is estimated to be 14% on average for the region (see Table 9 column 4). Multiplying values in columns 3 and 4 gives the difference in overall prices for the poor and general consumer. While the poor faced almost 3% higher prices than the general consumer in Bhutan, in other countries the added burden was under 2%. The small values (Table 9 , column 5) may look surprising to some but are justifiable. First and most important, DMC governments normally intervene to moderate staple price increases and/or assist the poor directly during times of crisis. Thus prices paid by the poor may be lower than prevailing international or even national market prices. Second, over the medium-and long-term, food prices move in tandem with nonfood prices, thus their CPIs do not differ significantly
(IMF [2011]-International Financial Statistics online).
Third, it is natural for consumers, especially the poor, to substitute more expensive items with relatively cheaper goods when prices rise in different proportions in crisis and noncrisis periods. This helps keep the crisis impact in check. Fourth, CPIs tend to overestimate true price increases (Dikhanov, Palanyandy, and Capilit, forthcoming) . And finally, food price hikes are a double-edged sword for the poor, as the majority of poor are farmers so surging food prices may actually benefit poor farmers while hurting the nonfood producing poor.
To see the impact of higher CPIs for the poor on poverty updates, poverty estimates with different CPIs can be compared (Table 10 ). It is noted that for countries not listed in Table 9 , the "Average" is used to represent the gap between general CPI and the CPI for the poor. These 21.5 million additional poor-a relatively small number-is the additional poverty impact due to gaps between the general CPI and CPI for the poor (which is about 2% on average), not the full impact of the food crisis on poverty. A recent ADB study on the full impact of rising food prices on poverty found that a 10% increase in domestic food prices could lead to an additional 64.4 million poor under the $1.25 per day poverty line (ADB, 2011a)
The impact of using different CPIs on poverty estimates under the $2 per day poverty line is shown in Table 11 . In terms of HCR, the impact remains small, with about a 0.71 percentage point difference, or 24.4 million additional poor. 17 Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A provide the poverty estimates using general CPIs. The results under the $2 per day poverty line were also calculated (see Table A6 of 
E.

Poverty Reduction in Previous Periods: A Comparison
V. Implications
As the powerhouse of global growth, developing Asia should see significant poverty reduction. This is consistent with the overarching goal of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
A. How is Asia and the Pacific Region Compared with the Rest of the World?
Asia and the Pacific region remains home to the largest number of the world's poor. By applying the elasticity approach to other regions using poverty elasticity of Iradian (2005) , growth rates from the World Development Indicators, and the 2005 poverty estimates from PovcalNet, one can calculate poverty shares by continent (Table 13 ). Based on these broad estimates, 63% of the world's extreme poor lived in Asia and the Pacific region in 2008. This is much larger than Sub-Saharan Africa (33%). Relative to 2005, Asia and the Pacific region's share dropped by a little over 4%, while Sub-Saharan Africa gained by almost 4%.
Poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa remains slow and unlikely to reach the 2015 Millennium Development Goal poverty target. While the headcount ratio (HCR) for SubSaharan Africa declined by 4 percentage points, the number of poor fell by only 6.7 million 19 .
19 Assuming Sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia continue to perform at the 2005-2009 average rates of per capita GDP growth in real terms, the tipping point where the two regions would swap their rankings in terms of total poor would happen in 2021. By then, there would be 388 million poor in developing Asia with an HCR of around 10%. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of poor would reach 392 million, and the HCR would be 35%. These findings are very broad estimates that rely heavily on assumptions about growth of per capita GDP and poverty elasticities, among others. Compared with Sub-Saharan Africa, ADF-Only DMCs are slightly better off. For SubSaharan Africa, HCR fell by 8.6% over the period, or a 1.6% reduction in the number of extreme poor. 20 Ordinary capital resources (OCR) refer to the pool of ADB resources that lower-to-middle-income countries can access at near-market terms. Most ADB lending comes from OCR. Borrowing countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, the People's Republic of China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam. Asian Development Fund (ADF) is the largest and oldest ADB special fund. It offers loans on concessional terms and grants to less developed countries with limited debt-repayment capability. ADF borrowers may be classified into two types: ADF-Only-those accessing purely ADF funds (usually the poorest DMCs); and ADF-Blend countriesthose with access to both ADF and OCR. ADF-Only DMCs include Bhutan, Cambodia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste; while ADF Blend countries include Armenia, Bangladesh, Georgia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam. Classifications are as of 16 June 2009 (Source: ADB website).
Poverty reduction in OCR, ADF-Only, and ADF-Blend DMCs are compared with Asia and the Pacific in terms of HCR and the number of poor under $1.25 per day poverty line (Figures 7, 8, and 9) . These figures confirm earlier findings that poverty reduction in low income DMCs, especially the ADF-Only DMCs, was slower than the rest of the region. Under the $2 per day poverty line, the 2008 estimates show that for OCR DMCs, the HCR decreased by 12.4%, implying a drop of 167 million poor people. For ADF DMCs, the decline is slightly less than 10% or 18 million people (Table 15) . Again, ADF-Only DMCs had the smallest HCR reduction, down only by 8.3%, or a 3.1% reduction in the number of $2 poor. 
C.
Where are Asia's Poor-Lower or Middle Income Countries?
As the PRC and India have reached middle income status, the majority of developing Asia's poor now live in middle income rather than lower income countries. This is consistent with Summer (2011) who found that 72% of the world's poor live in middle income countries compared with less than 10% in the 1990s. For developing Asia, 69% of the poor lived in low income countries in 2005. This reversed 3 years later, with middle income countries now home to 81% of developing Asia's poor. The main factor behind this dramatic change was the transition of India from low income to middle income status (Table 16 , Figure 13 ). 
VI. Conclusion
This paper updates poverty estimates for developing Asia from 2005 to 2008. The updated estimates show significant poverty reduction in the region under both the $1.25 per day and $2 per day poverty lines. As expected, for $1.25 per day poverty line, the People's Republic of China and India account for most of the reduction, driven by their impressive economic growth. In contrast, several developing member countries (DMCs) saw the number of poor increase, even if their headcount ratios declined. These economies typically recorded sluggish growth, indicating that poverty reduction largely depends on gross domestic product growth. Thus, for an Asia and the Pacific region free of poverty, maintaining economic growth is essential.
While economic growth is necessary, it is insufficient to guarantee significant poverty reduction. The results here demonstrate that the impact of growth on poverty was smaller during 2005-2008 relative to 2002-2005 . This corroborates the observed increases in inequality in Asia and the Pacific, implying the need for more inclusive growth. Policies and strategies that ensure equal access to opportunities and the establishment of social protection systems in the region are urgently required.
The relative poor performance of low-income countries in reducing poverty means continued support for these DMCs by the Asian Development Bank and other donors is critical. In this context, ADF-Only countries deserve additional assistance.
Despite continued poverty reduction in the region, Asia and the Pacific remains home to the majority of the world's poor. Clearly, the region faces serious challenges in the fight against poverty. Individual countries and regional organizations must continue to join forces in the fight against poverty. Moreover, international organizations and donors outside the region must be cognizant of Asia's heterogeneity when making or adjusting development policies.
Finally, this paper only updates poverty up to 2008 as more recent household survey data remain unavailable. Given the importance of reliable and up-to-date poverty estimates, it is essential for the development community and national governments to invest in improved data collection and dissemination of analytical results for further poverty research.
Appendixes
Appendix A 
Appendix B: Quasi Poverty Elasticity of Growth
Let Y denote the mean gross domestic product (GDP) and D denote its distribution; poverty indicator P, such as headcount ratio (HCR), can be expressed as , and where denotes poverty elasticity of growth and denotes poverty elasticity of distribution (or inequality). Thus, Note that in Kuznets' equation , thus the above equation can be written as where denotes distribution elasticity of growth or Kuznets' elasticity.
As changes in distribution are typically small from year to year and the Kuznets hypothesis underlying the Kuznets' equation may not be validmay not be statistically significantly different from 0, it seems acceptable to use quasi poverty elasticity of growth to assess the impact of growth on poverty. Even if the second term in the last equation above must be very small as both and are small. In any case, quasi poverty elasticity of growth can be used to compare the impact of growth on poverty in different time periods as long as the second term is small or remains more or less the same in different periods.
